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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between institutions and economic growth has attracted 
significant attention in recent years with the dominant view being that institutional 
quality positively influences economic performance of a country. However, the impact of 
similar kind of institutions on economic growth varies across regions and countries. 
Various reasons including, Income inequality and ethnic fragmentation have been put 
forth as proximate cause of the weaker relationship between institutions and economic 
growth [Easterly, et. al (2006); Ann-Sofie (2007)]. However not enough literature is 
available on why the impact of similar set of institutions on growth varies across 
countries and regions. Given that inequality may weaken the impact of institutional 
quality on growth, this study seeks to examine the composite impact of institutional 
quality and inequality on growth in selected Asian economies.  
Highly unequal societies may adversely influence the quality of institutions. 
Literature suggests variety of mechanisms through which this may happen. These include 
concentration of political power and social and ethnic fragmentation etc. Studies argue 
that if the political power is concentrated in society, then the few elites will shape 
institutions and policies to their own advantage—in such societies the government will 
make the kind of investment and offer the kind of services which favour the elite. It is 
also argued that the skewdness of the distribution of wealth contributes to political 
inequality which produces institutions that favour a small segment of the society [Olson 
(1993), Sonin (2003), Acemoglu (2003, 2005), Gradstein (2008)]. Engerman and 
Sokoloff relate institutional quality to inequality observed in factor endowments while 
Acemoglu relate this to colonialism. They argue that inclusive institutions were 
established in places where the European colonisers could settle themselves while 
extractive institutions were developed in countries/regions where the colonisers were to 
rule through minimal presence of their own.  
The primary objective of the study is to examine how institutional quality 
influences economic growth, given inequality. While seeking an answer to this question 
the independent impact of institutional quality and inequality on growth will be also be 
gauged. 
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant 
literature review while the empirical model, data sources and the model specification are 
presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes the estimation results Section 5 concludes the 
study. 
 
2.  REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
The debate over the importance of institutions in the growth process has been the 
focus of attention for some decades now. A variety of literature examines the growth 
process across nations in relation to many concepts ranging from inequality, trade, 
geography to institutions. Some of these works are reviewed below: 
 
2.1.  Inequality and Growth  
The relationship between inequality and growth has been repeatedly challenged 
making it difficult to capture the exact relationship between growth and inequality. While 
Kuznets’ inverted U-curve hints that inequality will rise as the economy grows in the early 
stage of development and falls when GDP per capita surpasses a certain level. However, it 
is argued that high inequality may lead to reduced economic growth, suggesting a negative 
relationship between inequality and growth [Alesina and Rodrik (1994); Persson and 
Tabellini (1994) and Clarke (1994)]. Explaining the negative relationship between growth 
and inequality Birdsall, et al. (1995) and World Bank ( 1993) point towards the fact that 
growth had been high in relatively egalitarian East Asia as compared to Africa and Latin 
America—the regions with high inequality. Perotti (1996) finds no evidence for the role of 
higher tax rates causing inequality but links the negative relationship between inequality 
and growth to the political instability and low human capital development more unequal 
societies. The negative inequality-growth relation has been challenged by many researchers 
who found zero, or a positive relationship between inequality and growth. [Forbes (2000); 
Barro (2000); Banerjee and Duflo (2003)]. These studies implicitly support the long held 
belief in economics about the positive association between inequality and growth. The 
underlying argument being that the rich with higher propensity to save will provide more 
capital for investment thereby positively influencing growth. However, given data 
constraints, especially regarding the data on inequality, these studies did not test the 
relationship for poor countries. 
A large strand of literature is focused on the mechanisms that characterise the 
inequality-growth relationship. Apart from the redistributive mechanism identified in the 
work of Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994), institutional 
mechanism is a strong determinant of the negative relationship between inequality and 
growth [Easterly (2002); Olson (1993); Acemoglu (2003, 2005) and Sokoloff and 
Engerman (2000)]. Easterly (2002) has examined the impact of inequality; on 
institutions, openness and schooling and he finds negative effect of inequality on all 
three. Olson (1993) and Acemoglu (2003) confirm the negative relationship between 
inequality and growth by identifying how inequality and political instability lowers the 
growth process. Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) emphasise the role of few powerful elites 
in delaying the implementation of growth enhancing policies and conclude the inequality 
adversely affects economic development.  
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Yet another channel of inequality-growth relationship is of credit market 
imperfections. The credit market imperfections affect growth through influencing access 
to education. Galor-Zeira (1993) and Perotti (1996) argue that given credit market 
imperfections a borrower ends up paying more interest making it difficult for the poor to 
borrow. This constrains the access to education for the poor and the formation of human 
capital. Easterly (2007) also supports the view that inequality has an adverse effect on 
human capital formation and economic development. Easterly’s cross country analysis 
suggests that inequality has been a barrier to schooling and economic prosperity. 
 
2.2.  Inequality and Institutions 
While the importance of institutions for development has widely been accepted, a 
significant body of literature confirms that institutional quality varies across countries. 
Several studies examine the impact of economic conditions on institutional quality. In 
particular, studies like Hoff and Stiglitz (2004), Sonin (2003), and Chong and Gradstein 
(2004) suggest that an egalitarian distribution of income is very important for establishing 
good institutions. Hoff and Stiglitz (2004) present a framework for institutional subversion; 
Sonin (2003) presents a dynamic model suggesting that low quality institutions are 
responsible for the adverse effect of inequality on growth as low-quality institutions are 
associated with wasteful redistribution towards the rich which affects the growth process 
negatively. Chong and Gradstein (2004) propose a mechanism which identifies that the 
intensity of rent seeking derived from a public asset—such as technological knowledge or a 
natural resource—is a source of low institutional quality. Using a panel vector 
Autoregressive approach and Granger causality test they find a bi-directional causal 
relationship between income inequality and institutions. Sonin (2003), using a theoretical 
model, shows that in the absence of democracy (political inequality and wealth inequality) 
the rich and the politically influential make the institutions work for their benefit through 
rent seeking activities. Such activities retard the development process due to waste of 
resources in rent seeking, resulting into lower growth and high inequality.  
Engerman and Sokolof (2002) and also Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) look at this 
relationship in historical perspective. They argue that initial (historical) factor 
endowments are the main determinants of inequality developed under colonial regimes. 
Given high inequality the colonial regimes were able to establish extractive institutions in 
Latin America whereas they failed to do so in North America, where relative 
egalitarianism prevailed. The authors argue that high inequality in these colonies 
provided unbalanced economic opportunities which benefited the elite.  In line with study 
of Engerman and Sokolof (2002), many social scientists and economists have 
successfully tested inequality’s hypothesis. Easterly (2001) using middle class share as a 
proxy for inequality and commodity endowments as an instrument for inequality 
confirms a negative relationship between inequality-democracy. Ericksonand Vollrath 
(2004) test the Engerman and Sokolof hypothesis using land inequality as a measure of 
inequality and they find no influence of land inequality on institutions. Quite contrary to 
the findings of Ericksonand Vollrath (2004), Keefer and Knack (2002) test the impact of 
land and income inequality on property rights controlling for political regimes 
(democracies versus autocracies). They show that inequalities negatively affect 
institutions (property rights). 
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Some studies, such as Bardhan (2001), Hoff and Stiglitz (2001), and Busch and 
Muthoo (2010) link the persistence of inefficient institutions with bargaining power. 
Bardhan (2001), using a simple Nash bargaining model, demonstrates that a growth-
enhancing institutional change may create would-be winners and would-be losers and 
argues that it is the would-be losers who would resist the change. They further argue that 
the change being resisted is potentially Pareto improvement. Similarly, Busch and 
Muthoo (2010) study the issue in a two player’s model in which the players have options 
to negotiate over an efficiency-enhancing institutional change. The model assumes that 
the players have perfect and complete information. They show that if this change is 
implemented then how the players’ respective bargaining power would be altered, 
resulting into a change in the players’ incentive to support or not to support the 
institutional change.  Both the studies   conclude that greater degree of inequality in the 
players’ bargaining powers leads to the persistence of inefficient institutions. Similarly in 
one of his pioneering works Acemoglu (2002) argues that the conflict over redistribution 
policies is a key factor determining the persistence of inefficient institutions. 
 
2.3.  Institutions and Growth 
The link between institutions and growth has been widely debated to explain the 
cross country variation in the development path. Since the first studies that used 
institutions as explanatory variables of growth in cross-country regressions [e.g., Barro 
(1991)], large number of works have used variety of datasets that provide ‘institutional 
variables’ to be added to the usual explanatory variables in cross-sectional growth 
regressions. e.g. International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Business Environment Risk 
Intelligence (BERI), the Polity database, the Freedom House index, etc. [Knack and 
Keefer (1995); Mauro (1995); Clague, et al. (1997) and Hall and Jones (1999)]. 
In a cross-country analysis, Knack and Keefer (1995) investigates the impact of 
property rights on economic growth using institutional indicators. These institutional 
indicators include quality of bureaucracy, property rights, and the political stability of a 
country compiled by country risk evaluators to potential foreign investors. They find a 
statistically significant positive relationship between institutions and economic growth. 
Similarly, Mauro (1995) and Easterly (1999) show that corruption affects the growth 
process negatively. The two popular studies which have examined the role of institutions 
on economic growth are Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, et al. (2001). The former 
focuses on social infrastructure and the later emphasises the risk of expropriation that 
current and potential investors face. Given the endogeniety between institutions and 
growth, both the studies use instrumental variables to examine the relationship between 
institutions and growth. Hall and Jones (1999) examine the hypothesis that the difference 
in cross-country economic performance is based on variations in inputs (physical capital 
and human capital). Their results show that the large amount of variation in the level of 
the Solow residual across countries cannot fully explain the differences in physical 
capital and educational attainment. They conclude that the differences in capital 
accumulation, productivity and therefore output per worker across countries are 
determined by differences in institutions and government policies, which they call social 
infrastructure. Acemoglu, et al. (2001) argue that European colonisers established good 
institutions in countries where the disease environment allowed them to settle, while they 
established extractive institutions in countries where they could not settle themselves. 
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Rodrik, et al. (2002) investigates the impact of institutions, geography and trade in 
affecting the variations in income levels around the world. Their results show that the 
quality of institutions succeed in explaining the variation—once institutions are 
controlled for, trade does not directly affect economic growth, while geography weakly 
affects it. Trade and other geographical indicators have negative relationship with 
growth. Rodrik, et al. (2002) finds a bi-directional relationship between institutional 
quality and trade. This suggests that trade can indirectly affect the growth process by 
improving institutional quality. They also examine the impact of geography on economic 
growth and their results confirm the findings of Easterly and Levine (2002) that 
geography has a significant effect on institutions, this could be, e.g. through the disease 
environment.   
The literature, discussed in this study provides a one link phenomenon in which 
either inequality has been linked to growth or to institutions, or institutions have been 
linked to growth and vice versa.  
Only a selected number of papers which study the determinants of institutions and 
the influence of these institutions on growth. Olson (1993), Acemoglu (2003), and (2005) 
discuss the political determinants of development in which they argue that political 
inequality affects economic institutions which in turn affect the growth process. In 
historical perspective Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) links the development pattern of the 
New World’s colonies to the initial level of inequality which, they argue, has resulted 
into the subversion of institutional quality in Africa and Latin America. The authors 
conclude that economic inequality in the age of colonisation adversely affects suffrage, 
schooling, banking and other institutions and continues to affect growth to this very day. 
Social and cultural dynamics of a country also play an important role in establishing 
efficient and much effective institutions. In line with this argument Ann-SofieIsaksson 
(2007) and Easterly, et al (2006) find that measures of social cohesion (or social division) 
such as income inequality and ethnic fractionalisation endogenously determine 
institutional quality which in turn causally determines growth. Gradstein (2008) 
emphasises on the role of political and economic inequality over formal institutions in the 
growth process. However, Mark Gradstein does not empirically test this relationship 
argued. The present study seeks to fill this gap. 
 
3.  EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Based on the literature reviewed above the behavioural relationship between 
income inequality, institutional quality and economic growth can be empirically 
formulated as follows 
Yit= β0 + β1Instit +β2Ineqit +β3Instit .Ineqit+β4Xit + ui,t  … … … (1) 
Yit is the annual per capita growth rate of GDP, Instit is institutional quality, Ineqit is 
inequality,  Instit× Ineqit is the interaction term allowing the institutional parameter to 
vary along inequality, Xi  is a vector of control variables including inflation, trade 
openness, change in capital taken as investment and population growth, whereas  uit is the 
random error term. 
The main focus in Equation 1 is on β3 which is the parameter for the interaction of 
institutional quality and inequality.  Interaction models are generally used to capture the 
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effect of one variable over the other through the mediating mechanism. For example 
Ann-Sofie (2007) investigates the impact of institutional quality on economic 
performance in socially segmented countries. To account for the role of social division on 
economic performance, the author employs a nonlinear model that captures the 
interaction between institutional quality and social division by using the term ‘Gini times 
social division’. The study finds that that though high institutional quality positively 
influences economic growth independently but this relationship is adversely affected in 
countries with high degree of social divisions. Similarly, Savoia and Easaw (2007) use 
the interaction of economic institutions and political equality (i.e. democracy) to gauge 
their combined influence on income inequality. They find that the impact of economic 
institutions on income inequality is influenced by the level of political equality. 
 
3.1.  Data Description and Sources 
We use panel data for nine low and lower-middle income countries.
1
 The selection 
of nine countries within the low and lower middle income countries is owed to data 
constraints—the data on income inequality (Gini coefficient)  for sufficient period to 
allow econometric analysis (1984-2010) is available only for these 9 countries, within the 
category of low and middle income countries.  
The studies on inequality often use the data on inequality developed by Dennigner 
and Squire (1996, 1998). The Denniger and Squire data set has been criticised on various 
counts by Atkinson and Brandolini (1999). They argue that the inequality measured by 
Denniger and Squire uses different variables for different countries, for example; 
individual versus household income, income vs. expenditure and pre-tax vs. post-tax 
income. They argue that the adjustment required to make the data comparable across 
countries has not been carried out. 
An alternative global inequality dataset as been constructed by University of Texas 
Inequality project (UTIP) based on Industrial Statistics data base published annually by 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO). This data does not 
measure household income inequality rather it is a set of measures of the dispersion of 
pay across industrial categories in the manufacturing sector. This source has been used 
most often in the literature for the study of inequality over time and across countries. Yet 
another source for inequality data is ‘Standardising World Income Inequality Dataset 
(SWIID)’ which provides data for more than 153 countries starting from 1960. It 
interpolates the missing data from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID). 
Recently, the updated version of ‘Standardising World Income Inequality Data Set’, 
SWIID, version 3.1 [Solt (2011)] has made it quite possible to study the issue of 
inequality for wide panel of countries.  
We have used Gini coefficient to measure income inequality and the data on the 
variable is from SWIID version 3.1. For institutional quality we have constructed an 
index comprising six features institutional quality. The components of the index of 
institutional quality include: democratic accountability, government stability, corruption, 
bureaucratic quality rule of law and investment profile. The data on these features of 
 
1The classification of low and lower middle income countries is based on WDI data set. The sample of 
countries include: Bangladesh, El-Salvador, Egypt, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippine, and Sri 
Lanka. 
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institutional quality is from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) published by the 
PRS Group. The index has been generated using Principal Component Analysis.
2
  
Computation of the index is shown in Appendix Table 2 while the detailed description of 
data source is given in Appendix Table 1. 
 
3.2.  Summary Statistics 
Appendix Table 3 presents summary statistics which includes mean, median, 
standard deviation and skewness for all the variables. Appendix Tables 4 and 5 present the 
correlation and covariance matrix. Institutional quality, trade openness and investment are 
positively correlated with per capita income growth while Gini index, population growth 
and the interactive term (Gini x institutional quality) are negatively correlated. The 
covariance matrix exhibits relationship similar to the ones observed in the correlation 
matrix. Gini index, population growth and the product of Gini and institutional quality 
covariate negatively with per capita income while all others covariate positively. 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This section explains the empirical model in detail along with its interpretation and 
robustness check in a subsequent manner. 
 
4.1.  Results  
 Two methods available for estimating panel data are the fixed effect and random 
effect model. The results from Hausmann test, reported in Appendix Table 6 reveal that 
fixed effect model is more suitable for estimation of the empirical model given by Equation 
1. Given that Hausman test favours fixed effects method, the model has been estimated 
using this method and to tackle endogeniety robustness of the results has been checked 
using two stage least square (2SLS). Per capita income growth the dependent variable: 
institutional quality, Gini index and the interactive term, Gini x institutional quality are 
main variables of our interest variables while we control for inflation, investment, trade 
openness and population growth. The Results are reported in Appendix Table 7. 
Institutional quality, positively influences growth, is highly significant and 
conforms to literature [Acemoglu, et al. (2004); Hall and Jones (1999); Knack and Keefer 
(1995); and Rodrik, et al. (2004)]. Income inequality, measured by Gini Index, is 
negatively correlated growth. The results indicated in the fixed effects model show that 
the coefficient of this variable is negative and highly significant at 1 percent. The 
coefficient suggests that a 1 percent increase in Gini Index leads to 0.38 percent decrease 
in economic growth.  The result is consistent with the findings of Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Clarke (1994).  In low income countries this 
negative inequality-growth relationship is consistent with the findings of Perotti (1996) 
who links the negative relationship to the political instability and low human capital 
development in these countries.  
The third variable which is the main focus of this study is the interactive term of 
income inequality and institutional quality. This is included to capture the effects of 
institutions on economic growth given high inequality in a society. The results show that 
 
2Principal component analysis is based on the frame work used by Bishoi, et al. (2009). 
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the interactive term, which is significant at 1 percent, affects economic growth 
negatively. A 1 percent increases in the coefficient of the interactive term (Gini x 
institutional quality) decreases growth by 0.49 percent.  Thus despite there being positive 
relation between institutional quality and growth the composite impact of income 
inequality and institutional quality on growth is negative. This implies that for institutions 
to play a positive role in economic growth a certain minimum level of egalitarianism in a 
society is essential, this being absent the composite impact is negative. 
Inflation, investment, trade openness and population growth are the control 
variables.  Investment/GDP is highly significant at 5 percent level of significance and is 
positively related to growth; while inflation (CPI), significant at 1 percent, is negatively 
associated with GDP. Trade openness and population growth influence growth positively. 
All the results are as expected.  
The results obtained from the 2SLS are similar to the results obtained from 
estimation of equation 1 using the fixed effects model. In 2SLS estimation, the validity of 
the results depends on the value of J-statistics which tests the null hypothesis of correct 
model specifications and over identification restriction i.e. the validity of the instruments. 
The results reported in Appendix Table 6 show that the null hypothesis is not rejected at 
any conventional level of significance (p = 0.129). This confirms the validity of the 
model and of the instruments used. 
 
4.2.  Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Check 
We have estimated a whole range of regressions using both the fixed effects model 
and the 2SLS, by including or excluding certain variables. In all the specifications the 
sign and significance of coefficients of institutional quality, inequality and their 
interactive term remain consistent. These results are presented in Appendix Table 8. 
 
5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Institutions are known to influence growth positively. While inequality that was 
once considered good for growth is now considered harmful. We argued that it is not 
appropriate to consider the effect of either institutions or inequality on growth in isolation 
because both may interact to influence growth. For example, given high inequality, 
otherwise brilliant individuals may not make it to the labour market due to market 
frictions. Similarly despite equality of opportunity, organisations may not overcome the 
problem of adverse selection if the institutions meant for identifying the right individual 
are of poor quality. Therefore the composite impact of institutional quality and inequality 
is an important determinant of growth. We find that the impact of the interactive term, 
‘institutional quality times inequality’ on economic growth is negative. This is despite the 
fact that the independent impact of institutions on growth is positive. The implication is 
that for a sustained and decent growth, improvements in institutional quality as well as 
alleviation of inequality are important.  
  




Description of Variables 
S. No. Variable Description / Source 
1. Economic Growth (Y) GDP per capita growth (% annual). / WDI 
2. Income Inequality (Gini) Gini Coefficients. / SWIID Version 3.1 
3. Institutional Quality Index(Q) ICRG Components/PCA Index 
4. Investment (Inv) Gross fixed capital formation as percentage of 
GDP. /WDI 
5. Population Growth (PG) Population Growth(% Annual)./WDI 
6. Inflation (Inf) Consumer Prices (Annual %)./WDI 




Eigen Values of Correlation Matrix 
  PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 
Eigen values  2.93 1.01 0.78 0.51 0.44 0.33 
Variance % 192.13 22.59 26.92 7.18 10.92 - 
Cumulative % 48.81 65.6 78.62 87.15 94.49 100 
Eigen Vectors      
Variables PC 1 PC 2 PC 3 PC 4 PC 5 PC 6 
Bureaucratic Quality 0.43 0.03 -0.43 0.65 -0.44 -0.SS12 
Corruption 0.33 0.47 0.69 -0.01 -0.38 0.20 
D. Accountability 0.35 0.63 -0.32 -0.04 0.59 0.18 
Government Stability 0.43 -0.52 -0.03 -0.11 0.06 0.72 
Investment Profile 0.46 -0.05 -0.23 -0.71 -0.27 -0.40 




 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. deviation 
Economic Growth 2.81 2.86 17.15 -15.70 3.10 
Institutional Quality 0.49 0.51 0.78 0.19 0.12 
GINI 38.61 35.79 53.23 26.92 6.74 
GINI x Inst. Quality 19.15 18.56 34.77 5.41 5.78 
Inflation 9.58 8.35 58.39 0.52 7.04 
Trade Openness 56.46 53.62 136.75 12.36 26.16 
Investment 21.93 21.54 38.11 11.46 5.36 
Population Growth 1.80 1.80 3.42 -1.61 0.68 
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Table 4 
Correlation Matrix 
 Y Q GINI GINI*Q INF TO INV PG 
Economic Growth (Y) 1        
Institutional Quality (Q) 0.29 1       
GINI -0.18 0.02 1      
GINI x Inst.Q -0.12 0.83 0.55 1     
Inflation (INF) -0.41 -0.34 0.05 -0.27 1    
Trade Openness (TO) 0.10 0.25 0.68 0.62 0.01 1   
Investment (INV) 0.30 0.38 0.05 0.33 0.12 0.31 1  




 Y Q GINI GINI*Q INF TO INV PG 
Economic Growth (Y) 9.591        
Institutional Quality (Q) 0.110 0.015       
GINI -3.870 0.016 45.303      
GINI x Inst. Quality -2.234 0.586 21.356 33.237     
Inflation (INF) -9.091 -0.294 2.515 -11.147 49.433    
Trade Openness (TO) 8.058 0.823 121.008 92.792 17.752 681.432   
Investment (INV) 5.067 0.253 1.709 10.201 4.657 42.953 28.667  




Correlated Random Effects—Hausman Test 
Test Cross-section Random Effects 
Test Summary (Panel 1) Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section Random 24.8906 6.0000 0.0004 
(Panel 2)  Cross-section Random Effects Test Comparisons: 
Variable Fixed Random Var(Diff.) Prob 
Institutional Quality -4.63 3.88 32.19 0.03 
GINI x Inst. Quality 0.06 -0.15 0.02 0.18 
Inflation -0.18 -0.16 0.00 0.01 
Trade Openness -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 
Investment 0.20 0.15 0.01 0.11 
Population Growth 0.07 -1.29 0.15 0.03 
Panel (3) Cross-section Random Effects Test Equation: 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.90 1.14 0.79 0.42 
Institutional Quality -4.69 6.41 -0.72 0.47 
GINI x Inst. Quality 0.06 0.14 0.42 0.67 
Inflation -0.18 0.02 -6.84 0.00 
Trade Openness -0.001 0.01 -0.13 0.89 
Investment 0.20 0.05 4.06 0.00 
Population Growth 0.38 0.16 0.02 0.002 
Effects Specification     
Cross-section Fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.45 F-statistic 12.77 
Adjusted R-squared 0.41 Prob(F-statistic) 0.00 
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Table 7 
Empirical Findings 
 Fixed Effect 2SLS Random Effect 
Institutional Quality 14.58 29.17 17.710 
 (8.86)*** (11.44) ** (7.67) ** 
GINI -.38 -0.53 -.16 
 (0.11)* (0.14)* (0.08) *** 
Inflation -0.22 -0.26 -0.22 
 (0.02)* (0.03)* (0.02)* 
Trade Openness 0.23 0.53 -0.002 
 (0.02) (0.009) (0.02) 
Investment 0.23 0.15 0.24 
 (0.04)* (0.07) ** (0.03)* 
Population Growth 0.07 0.28 -1.28 
 (0.45) (0.75)* (0.2) 
GINI x Inst. Quality -0.49 -0.87 -0.56 
 (0.22)** (0.28)* (0.19)* 
C -14.06 -18.48 -2.42 
 (4.76)* (6.26)* (3.42) 
R-square 0.48 0.46 0.417 
Adjusted R-squared 0.45 0.41 0.39 
F-statistics 14.44 – 23.96 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00 – 0.00 
J-statistic – 9.89 – 
Prob(J-statistic) – 0.13 – 
Note: All the values in the parenthesis denote standard errors. The ***, **and * indicate the significance at 10 
percent, 5 percent and 1 percent respectively.  
 
Table 8 
Robustness Check and Sensitivity Analysis 
 Fixed Effects 2SLS 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Institutional Quality 6.51 -4.31 14.58 26.25 5.95 29.18 
 (1.62)* (2.24)*** (8.86)*** (13.97)** (2.62) (11.44)** 
GINI – –0.19 -0.39 – -0.26 -0.54 
  (0.07)* (0.11)*  (0.09)* (0.14) * 
Inflation – -0.22 -0.23 – -0.2 -0.26 
  (0.025)* (0.03)*  (0.03)* (0.04)* 
Trade Openness – 0.01 0.02 – 0.01 0.03 
  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) 
Investment – -0.24 0.24 – 0.27 0.15 
  (0.05)* (0.05)*  (0.06)** (0.07)** 
Population Growth – 0.02 0.06 – -0.07 0.28 
  (0.46) (0.46)  (0.54) (0.76) 
GINI x Inst. Quality – – -0.49 – – -0.87 
   (0.22)**   (0.28)* 
C -0.41 -6.25 -14.06 -19.54 -7.84 18.48 
 (0.82)* (3.20) (4.76)* (6.57) (3.79)* (6.26) 
R-squared 0.25 0.48 0.49 0.16 0.38 0.47 
Ad. R-squared 0.22 0.44 0.45 0.11 0.33 0.41 
F-statistic 8.80 14.87 14.44 – – – 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 – – – 
J-statistic – – – 3.85 6.93 9.89 
Prob(J-statistic) – – – 0.28 0.22 0.12 
Note: All the values in the parenthesis denote standard errors. The ***, **and * indicate the significance at 10 percent, 5 
percent and 1 percent respectively.  
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